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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COMMERCE CLAUSE-LOCAL SMOKE CONTROL OR-
DINANCE NoT AN UNDUE BURDEN ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE-In accordance 
with a scheme of federal ship inspection,! appellant possessed certificates 
which permitted its ships to operate on the Great Lakes2 and which specified 
the type of boiler which might be used. While two of its ships were docked in 
Detroit, smoke was emitted from their boilers in violation of the minimum 
density and duration requirements of the Detroit Smoke Abatement Code.3 
1 REv. STAT. §§ 4399-462 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 390-416, ~35-36 (1958). 
2 REv. STAT. § 4321 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 263 (1953). 
3 DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 184 (1954). 
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The equipment which appellant was then using made compliance with the 
ordinance impossible. When criminal proceedings were instituted against 
appellant, it brought an action to enjoin the City of Detroit from enforcing 
the ordinance on the theory that the regulation placed an unconstitutional 
burden on interstate commerce.4 The lower court denied the injunction 
and was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Michigan.5 On appeal to the 
United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, two Justices dissenting.6 A 
state police power regulation which neither discriminates against interstate 
commerce nor disrupts a national policy of uniform regulation is constitu-
tional. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
The constitutionality of a state police power regulation affecting inter-
state commerce should be grounded on an assessment of the functional 
interests raised by the facts of the particular case. In the principal case, 
however, the Court disposed of the commerce clause question by reference 
to formal, conceptual statements of law'T and gave no indication that it had 
considered such functional factors as the effect of the ordinance upon the 
flow of commerce, the effectiveness of the regulation in eliminating the 
evil to be controlled, or the character of the business being regulated.8 
In other cases the Court has adopted a more active role by expressly weigh-
ing state and national interests, by appearing to inquire into the wisdom 
and effectiveness of the legislation, and by otherwise discussing the func-
tional aspects of the case in its written opinion.9 However, it is likely that 
in determining the constitutionality of a state regulation affecting inter-
state commerce the Court always considers the functional aspects of the 
case,10 but only in some cases does it do so expressly in its written opinion.H 
4 Appellant also argued that Congress had pre-empted the field through a scheme of 
federal ship inspection and that the possession of a federal license to operate precluded 
state regulation. Both the Michigan Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court 
rejected these contentions. For a discussion of these aspects of the case, see The Supreme 
Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. REv. 132 (1960). 
5 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 355 Mich. 227 (1959). 
6 Justices Douglas and Frankfurter dissented. They based their dissent on the pre-
emption issue and argued that the requirements of the Detroit smoke ordinance were in 
conflict with the federal statute. 
1 In its most extended analysis of the commerce clause problem, the majority notes: 
"The claim that the Detroit ordinance •.. imposes ..• an undue burden on interstate 
commerce needs no extended discussion. State regulation, based on the police power, 
which does not discriminate against interstate commerce or operate to disrupt its required 
uniformity may constitutionally stand." Principal case at 448. 
s For other examples of this approach, see Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932); 
South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). 
tl See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 76S (1945). 
10 "[W]hen judicial theory is cast in conceptual terms that seek to avoid the weighing 
of functional values, the result frequently is to obscure the judicial identification and 
appraisal of the functional interests that lead to the conceptual characterization." KAUPER, 
FRONTIERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTY 94 (1956). 
11 If, on a preliminary consideration of the facts of a case, it is obvious to the Court 
that the underlying functional considerations clearly require them to sustain or to in-
validate a state regulation, it seems likely that the Court would save time by framing its 
opinion in terse, conceptual language rather than writing a lengthy opinion containing an 
exhaustive consideration of the functional values raised. 
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Thus when attempting to predict the Court's position with respect to this 
type of regulation, it seems better to assess the functional interests which 
the Court has expressly or implicitly considered than to try to extract gen-
eral rules of law from the conceptual language of the Court. 
One of the important functional factors which the Court has expressly 
considered in its written opinions12 is the existence or non-existence of 
conflicting state regulations on the same subject.is It is questionable 
whether this should be a determinative factor in deciding the constitu-
tionality of a state regulation. If the mere existence of a conflict between 
the laws of different states is a sufficient ground for invalidating a statute, 
healthy innovation would be stifled and the later of two conflicting state 
regulations would need to be invalidated.14 Furthermore, a court might 
interpret "conflicting state regulations" to mean "conflicting state policies." 
The regulations of two states would then be in conflict whenever one state 
passed a positive regulation dealing with an area which the other state 
chose to leave unregulated. Acceptance of this view would require that the 
ordinance in the principal case be invalidated, for the record would show 
conflicting state regulations although no other state was shown to have a 
smoke control ordinance. A second functional factor which has influenced 
the Court's decisions is the effect of the regulation on the free flow of 
commerce. If state regulations merely increase the cost of engaging in 
interstate commerce,15 the Court will be less likely to invalidate the regula-
tion than if it actually restricts the physical flow of goods from one state to 
another.16 Compliance with the smoke regulation in the principal case 
would not restrict the free flow of goods across state lines but would 
merely increase the cost of engaging in commerce17 by requiring the ap-
pellant to install a different type of boiler if he is to comply with th<: 
ordinance. A third important functional factor which the Court has con-
sidered is the effectiveness of the regulation in achieving the goal which the 
state is attempting to attain through the use of its police power.18 When 
it is not clear that the regulation aids in achieving this goal, the Court is 
more inclined to invalidate the regulation. For example, in invalidating a 
12 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 9; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 
359 U.S. 520 (1959); principal case at 448. 
13 For a discussion of the problems the Court has had in defining "conflict" between 
a state and federal law, see The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HARv. L. R.Ev. 132 (1960) 
14 See The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 168 (1959). 
15 See Sproles v. Binford, supra note 8; South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barn-
well Bros., supra note 8. 
16 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note 12; Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madi• 
son, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). 
17 The Court noted in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526 that 
"cost taken into consideration with other factors might be relevant in some cases to the 
issue of burden on commerce." 
18 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, supra note 9; Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, supra 
note 12. 
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maximum train length regulation in Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona19 the 
Court expressed doubt that the regulation would increase safety by reducing 
train accidents and employee injuries. Long trains are not, in themselves, 
a recognized danger; railroad safety might be improved by operating a 
small number of long trains rather than an increased number of short 
trains. However, in the principal case, smoke is itself a recognized evil; 
clearly limitations upon its density and duration help in attaining the 
city's objective of reducing smoke. A fourth functional factor which the 
Court has considered is the nature and extent of the interest which the 
state is trying to protect by enacting the police power regulation. If it ap-
pears that the state is regulating some legitimate local interest, the Court 
will be more inclined to uphold the enactment. For example, a state's 
proprietary interest in the maintenance of its highways weighs heavily in 
favor of laws regulating the use of those highways.20 In the principal case 
it is clear that Detroit has a legitimate local interest in protecting its 
inhabitants and their property from air pollution. 
Apart from the factors which the Court has expressly considered, there 
are other factors which courts should consider when passing upan the con• 
stitutionality of state regulation of interstate commerce. Where compliance 
with the regulation affects equipment use, courts should consider whether 
the ordinance makes a specific requirement concerning the type of equip-
ment to be used21 or whether it merely sets an objective standard of per-
formance. ,;r\,7here the type of equipment is specified a carrier engaged in 
interstate commerce may be forced to stop and change equipment if two 
states have differing specific requirements.22 On the other hand, if an 
objective standard of performance is defined, this standard may be met by 
the use of various types of equipment and would leave the affected carrier 
free to move between all states without equipment changeover so long as 
it met the most stringent standard. Such an objective standard existed in 
the principal case, for the ordinance set maximum limits on the density 
and duration of smoke. Thus, a carrier would be free to choose his equip-
ment and operate in all states, without equipment changeover, simply by 
conforming to the most stringent smoke ordinance. Among other functional 
factors which the courts might consider are the extraterritorial effect of 
the state regulation, the economic effect on the industry most directly 
affected, and the likelihood of congressional action to alleviate burdens 
imposed by local laws. The importance of the latter factor can be seen in 
the principal case. Since Congress has expressly recognized air pollution 
19 !!25 U.S. 761, 776-79. 
20 See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., supra note 8. 
21 For example, the Illinois statute in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note 
12, specified the type of mudguard which was required to be used on trucks using the 
state's highways. 
22 This was the situation in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., supra note 12, for 
Illinois and Arkansas each required a different type of mudguard to be used. 
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as a matter of local concem,23 it is not likely to pass a uniform smoke 
control law. Thus an invalidation of this smoke ordinance would have 
meant that there could be no effective smoke regulation in Detroit. The 
Court properly avoided this result. 
John M. Niehuss 
23 S. REP. No. 389, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). 
